In an effort to encourage progress in the area of human information processing, Einhorn [1976] suggested that researchers in this area begin to incorporate information search and choice in their experimental designs. Traditionally, experiments in this area have presented subjects with a predetermined set of cues to utilize in forming certain judgments. This type of design, Einhorn observes, can reduce the involvement of subjects in the experimental task. In fact, few studies have replicated the richness of the information search environment, and few have implicitly studied information choice and acquisition in experimentation (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein [1977, pp. 7-9]). The only known studies that explicitly employed information choice by subjects are those by Pankoff and Virgil [1970] and Payne [1976].
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The rest of this paper is diyided into seyeral sections: (a) a brief review of relevant literature; {b) statement of the problem and the objectives of the study; (c) a brief discussion of how we adapted the lens model approach to include information acquisition by subjects; (rf) the design of the study and the type of subjects who acted as decision makers; {e) the results in terms of comparison with several performance indices; {f) replication of the experiment and attempts to deal with the incompatibUity of priors; and (g) concluding remarks and limitations.
Prediction of Failure and Information Processing
Research concerning the prediction of faUure has foUowed two approaches: (1) using mathematical or statistical models based upon publicly ayaUable data (see Ohlson [1980] for a reyiew of recent work), and (2) the ability of human decision makers to use accounting information in discriminating between faUed and nonfailed pairs of firms. As summarized in Bernstein [1974, pp. 462-65] , earlier studies concerning the • prediction of faUure using publicly ayaUable accounting information haye UtUized a mixed mode of time-series (trends) and cross-sectional data. The recent work by Beayer [1966] , Altman [1968] , and Deakin [1972] used cross-sectional analysis only by using a paired sample of faUed (mostly bankrupt) and nonfaUed firms. Recently, Ohlson [1980] also used accounting information in a cross-sectional analysis to form a probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy.
Some of the work which utUized the second approach was characterized by the stimulus-black box response paradigm (e.g., Abdel-khalik [1973] ), whUe other work emphasized the methods that judges apply in integrating, differentiating, and processing information (Libby [1975; 1976] and Kennedy [1975] ).
Research Problem and Objective
In reyiewing this prior eyidence, two issues of interest emerge. The first relates to the definition of faUure used in prior studies (typically bankruptcy). To Ulustrate the importance of this issue, we wUl refer to Beayer's graphs [1966, p. 82] depicting the temporal behayior of the three ratios he found most predictiye of faUure.' These graphs show that the cash Oow/total debt and net income/total assets ratios exhibited a continuous decline in the health of the faUed firms (mostly bankrupt) throughout the fiye years prior to the faUure. The third ratio, total debt/total assets, depicted a high leyel of debt-to-equity structure of faUed firms relative to ' It should be noted that Beaver [1966] defined bankruptcy as "the inability of a firm to pay its financial obligations as they mattire"; however, his data included fifty-nine bankrupt firms, sixteen involved nonpayment of preferred dividends, three bond defaults, and one overdraft. Most authors adopt the same definition (except Altman [1968] ), but they use mostly bankrupt firms.
that of nonfailed firms for all five years, with a sharply increasing trend in this ratio up to bankruptcy. Hence, financial ratios are structurally at their worst (but most predictive) level in the year prior to bankruptcy. Indeed, Ohlson [1980] found that annual reports of many bankrupt firms were actually released after they declared bankruptcy.
Lending analysts, however, may be just as interested (or even more interested) in predicting "default on loans," which, in most cases, is an event that occurs earlier than a year away from bankruptcy. Since more firms default on debt than go bankrupt, we used the event of default on debt as the environmental event to be predicted.
The second problem with earlier studies is that they provided a predetermined set of information cues for judges to utilize in making decisions.* Although subjects could make selective use of cues given to them, under this approach the initial information choice set was determined by the researcher alone. Alternatively, if decision makers could share in the information choice at the initial stage, and also continue to exercise additional choice by selectively using only some of the acquired cues, their task involvement would more likely increase. While the selective use of cues probably takes place in all experiments, having subjects participate in making the initial choice of information cues does constitute an additional experimental structure that has not been studied previously. As Einhom pointed out, in forming judgments in a real-life decision situation, "information must be searched for-it is not given" [1976, p. 200] . He adds: "As I have tried to point out, in most real judgment situations, the judge takes a much more active role by searching for information, forming hypotheses, etc." [1976, p. 205] . In his view, highly structured experiments (with no sharing of information choice) could lead judges to take a passive role in performing the task.
While the objectives of this study are threefold-(a) to involve the decision maker in the judgment task under consideration. (6) to improve the definition of the environmental event designated as a failure, and (c) to provide indices for possible evaluation of the quality of choice and use of information by judges-its main one is to evaluate the relative contribution of each of the two acts made by loan officers in predicting defaultinformation choice and information processing.
" Indeed we know of only two studies which dealt with this issue. In the study hy Pankoff and Virgil [1970] . financial analysts in the St. Louis area participated in an experiment which involved acquiring information, forecasting stock prices, and making portfolio decisions. Pankoff and Virgil simulated a setting where each analyst had an initial endowment, a limited amount of information and the possibility of acquiring additional information at a predetermined (hypothetical) cost. They observed that most frequently purchased items were earnings per share, company sales, industry sales, and stock price indices. They concluded that the quality of performance was not generally a function of acquired information, and that the usefulness of information acquisition appeared to be in satisfying tbe analysts' desire for inputs, which they called "input demand." In another study, Payne [1976] simulated information seeking as a search-for-an-apartment problem, where subjects were asked to seek information ahout each apartment from among a limited set of cues.
Research Design and Method

APPROACH
In adapting the experimental design of the lens model so as to incorporate acts of information choice and processing, we looked upon the problem of information choice as consisting of three stages: (i) Based on theoretical or empirical models, the researcher determines a set of information cues which are highly associated with and predictive of the environmental event, {ii) At the second stage, the decision maker or the judge is given the option of selecting a limited numher of cues from the above set, which was initiaUy determined by the reseju'cher. {Hi) The information cues chosen hy the judge or the decision maker could stiU he selectively used in forming the judgment, which is an act of further exercising information choice.
Several considerations need to be discussed here. First, the judge or the decision maker could he either a human or a mathematical (a mechanical) model. The information cues chosen are uniquely determined hy the judge making the choice. The components of the chosen cues (corresponding to the second stage above) must be constrained (either by cost or by number), otherwise human decision makers are likely to acquire aU information cues determined by the researcher in the first stage.'' SimUarly, the "shopping list" of possible cues determined by the researcher at the first stage should not he too large because the measurement of a chosen cue must he made avaUahle on demand to the judge during the conduct of the experiment.
The choice processes exercised hy the mathematical model (or the mechanical decision maker) and hy the human judge had simUarities, but differed in the procedure implemented in this experiment to affect the choice. The model search was accomplished by having a mechanical model scan aU measures of the cues in the shopping list (determined by the researcher), rank-order them by their predictive power (or according to some optimization rule), and list the set of cues that would maximize the prediction. For the human search, however, judges were given only the names (or descriptions) of aU the cues included in the shopping list or the information choice set (not their measurements) and were permitted to acquire measurements of a suhset of those cues according to their own preferences.
Given that the prediction of the environmental event is the principal task, three different sources of predictions are applicahle: human predic-' If subjects are not constrained in their choice, and if they perceive some of the information cues presented in the "shopping list" as irrelevant, their performance should not be expected to improve. The results of experimentation in the literature on multiplecue probability learning (Castellan [1977] ) show that (a) the larger the number of irrelevant cues, the worse the performance of judges, and (ft) the larger the number of irrelevant cues, the slower the rate of learning [1977, pp. 36-37]. tions made by the decision makers, predictions based on "models of man," and predictions made by a mathematical model independent of the others. Each type of prediction utilizes information cues chosen either by the mathematical model (the mechanical decision maker), or by human decision makers. The resulting six combinations of the information choice and prediction form the six strategies that are shown in table 1.
The predictive validity of each of these six strategies is assessed on the basis of percentage of correct classification (hit rates) as used by Libby [1975; 1976] instead of correlations. Other than changing the approach to include information choice, which increases the number of combinations, the three predictions (by human judges, by "their models," and by the environmental mathematical model) are fundamentally those highlighted by Goldberg [1970] and used by others. Measures of predictive validity of these six strategies are used below in obtaining indices of performance evaluation.
FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE
The Index of Corporate Events in issues of the Disclosure Journal (1973-75) was screened to obtain a list of firms that defaulted for nonpayment of debt, but not for other reasons such as covenant violation. Two constraining criteria reduced the sample size: (a) the availability of the firm's financial statements in publicly available sources such as Moody's for five years prior to default, and (b) the need to find a set of firms which had not defaulted on debt and which were comparable to the defaulted firms in terms of size (as measured either by total assets or by total sales) and industry classification. The resultant sample size consisted of sixteen defaulted firms which were individually matched with another sixteen firms representing twelve industries. These firms represented the experimental sample shown in panel A of table 2. Subsequently, the same procedure was repeated for the selection of another sample of defaulting firms from among those listed in the Index of Corporate HP I HS is the •prediction of the environmental event by human subjects based on their own information selection This is frequently called the achievement index.
MP, I HS Ls the prediction of the environmental event using the mechanical model built to structure human responses in a linear form using human.select«d information.
MP, I MS is the model's environmental predictability using the model.selected information Events of 1975-76. After applying the same screening criteria discussed aboye, a sample of fourteen defatilted firms was obtained. This sample is shown in panel B of table 2.* The releyance of the two panels is discussed later.
FINANCIAL RATIOS AND THEIR DISCRIMINATING POWER
Preyious studies of the usefulness of financial ratios in predicting faUure used both trends and point estimates of the ratios, with the more contemporary ones using point estimates only. Since multicoUinearity between financial ratios leads to a disagreement about the identity of most of the discriminating financial ratios,^ we simply compUed an information set (call it the shopping list) consisting of ten financial ratios that were used in preyious studies and eight trends. A trend was estimated by the ayerage emnual change in a financial item over the five years preceding the year in which default occurred. A step-wise discriminant analysis was used for model search; two models were estimated, one for each of the panels A and B. The results of the models' information choice and prediction are shown in table 2.
In order to validate these results, the discriminant analysis model produced by panel B was applied to the data of panel A. Giyen that both panels haye the same nondefault (control) sample, the importance of this cross-yalidation lies in the classification of the defaulted sample of panel A, which correctly predicted 57 percent, since the entire nondefault ' The nondefault firms were used as if they were a control sample to be compared with an experimental sample. It is true that even though the firms in panel B were not matched (as were those in panel A), the results obtained for panel B were even better than those obtained for panel A. Such a result did not lead us to reject the notion of the "control" sample, although, in retrospect, it would appear that selecting another sample would have simplified the presentation.
'' The recent study by Ohlson [1980] suggested four factors: (1) a measure of size, (2) a measure of financial structure, (3) a measure(s) of performance, and (4) a measure(s) of liquidity. We have used all except size. sample would be correctly classified. This additional step was employed in order to evaluate the bounds of correct classification obtained by using mechanical or mathematical models. As shown in table 2, the upper bound for the experimental sample is 0.906 correct classification, whereas the lower bound is obtained from the cross-validation of the defaulted firms, which is about 0.57.
SUBJECTS AND THE TASK
The decision makers who participated in this study consisted of twentyeight commercial lending officers in a large metropolitan area. AU twentyeight subjects were contacted through a senior administrator in their respective banks, and there was no experimental mortality of subject participation. The average lending experience of the participating officers was about eight years. A capable doctoral student (who had some business experience in n\anagement) was recruited to conduct the interviews with these lending officers. Each interview was prearranged and was conducted individually in the office of each analyst.
In the instructions given to the anedysts, the objective of the study was stated as the need to compare the relative importance of various financial indicators in forming judgments about whether a firm wiU default on the payment of its debt within one year or two years from the date on which the information was prepared. They were informed that (1) the firms were real; (2) some of them had actually defaulted on the payment of debt at a date subsequent to the time period covered by the financial information included in the shopping list; (3) the firms were presented to them in a random order; and (4) the proportion of defaulted to nondefaulted firms was not representative of the true proportion observed in real life.'^ They were also informed that all the information cues named in the information choice set were derived from audited financial statements through the year before the default date.
The task consisted of making judgments about whether each of the firms in the list should be classified in the defaulted or the nondefatUted category. The judgment was to be based on the information acquired under a given set of assumptions. There were two sequences of such acts of information acquisition, use, and judgment. The assumptions given to them were stated as follows: (1) Your (hypothetical) budget for purchasing information for the purpose of predicting default is 100 points. (2) Information items may be supplied to you at (hypotheticaJ) cost. The price schedule is provided below. (3) You are permitted to purchase no more than four pieces of information at any one time. (4) If you purchase one piece of data, it will be provided to you for all firms.
We used points instead of dollars out of concern for the potential impact of the differential utility for money. The choice of four information ' We discuss the implication of this statement in the section entitled 'Dealing with Priors." items as a maximum per each cycle of information acquisition-use-judgment was basicaUy arbitrary. In conducting the experiment, analysts were encouraged to use at least one information cue in each of the cycles.
The experimental materisds consisted of two single-spaced pages of instruction, the first containing the firm's identification number (from 1 to 32) and its industry and a space for responding to questions in the first round of the information purchase-use-decision. The second page was used for making judgments in the second round. A single sheet of paper was also provided to each lending officer listing the names of the eighteen information cues constituting the choice (or shopping) list. In each interview, the research assistant started with a general conversation for about five minutes, during which he inquired about the officer's lending experience and other issues that might appear to be of interest. The assistant would then hand the written instructions to the lending officer and ask him to read it and foUow instructions. The last item on the instruction sheet reminded the officer that he had to reveal his information choice, at which time the research assistant would provide sheets containing only the information requested and charge the officer's account with the cost (points) stated in the supply table. In order to facUitate this process, each of the eighteen information items was produced on a single detached column and presented for each of the thirtytwo firms exactly in the same sequence and spacing as the listing of the firms on the answer sheet. So, if an officer wanted to buy information items numbered 2 (net income/sales) and 4 (cash flow/total deht), he would get two narrow sheets of paper so that he could look at hoth information items in the sequence in which each of the thirty-two firms was presented.
After making their information choice in the first round, lending officers were told how many points remained in their budget. They then would ex£anine the information and make judgments on each of the thirty-two firms as "default," "no default." A sinular process was repeated for the second cycle of buy-use-decide. When the task was completed, almost aU of the suhjects indicated that they thought the experiment was more engaging than they had initiaUy expected, and they wished to know how "weU" they did. The only feedback given to the subjects between the two rounds was that they could improve their judgments hy selecting more information. At the end of each round of judgment, lending officers were requested to rank the importance of each item they purchased as they perceived its contrihution toward facUitating their judgments.
MOTIVATION OF DECISION MAKERS
A measure of performance inherent in the task was provided to the decision makers who participated in this study. In the instructions about the experiment, they were told:
Since we know which firms in the sample have actuaUy defaulted on the payment of their debt in the fiscal year foUowing the date of the information provided here, we can derive a measure of the quality of utilization and the infonnation to predict the default and to be able to compare your effectivene.ss with other lending officers. The measure of such a quantity is computed as: This measure of performance could be maximized by minimizing purchases of information acquisition, while at the same time increasing the number of correct predictions'. Naturally, we did not know what behavioral effects would be induced by telling subjects that their performance would be compared with other lending officers, except that they were enthused about the comparison. Although incorporating an implicit performance evaluation function could have provided additional motivation to participants in the experiment, we make no claims that this is a perfect surrogate for a real-life reward. The motivation provided is constrained by the nature of the experiment and the findings have to be so interpreted.
Analysis and Results
SUBJECTS' INFORMATION CHOICE PROFILE
Interviews with the lending analysts were arranged over a period of two months. An interview lasted, on the average, about seventy-five minutes, which were devoted to reading the instructional material, contemplating information acquisition, making judgments, acquiring additional information, and revising those judgments. The experimenter was always present to supply the information on request and to collect the results. The frequency count of information items acquired by the officers dtiring the two rounds is shown on the left-hand side of table 3. As shown, the most frequently ptirchased pieces of information and those perceived as most useful were earnings trend, current ratio, cash flow to total debt, and trend of cash flow to total debt. The judges were permitted to repeat the cycle in order to improve their judgments; the additional information items most frequently acquired were total debt to total assets, long-term debt to net worth, and trend of net income to sales.
Note that there is one-to-one correspondence between the relative frequency with which an information item was acquired and the perceived importance attached to it by the analysts. Furthermore, we observed that those analysts who acquired more information cues in the first round continued to acquire relatively more in the second round. ' The concept of cost as a weight in the percentage of correct classification was used only as a constraint on the choice of information. Granted, the constraint has no externed validity, but the concern here was more of intemai validity and motivation of .subjects. In addition to the measures of performance to be derived from the three prediction strategies in table 1, additional standards or benchmarks for evaluation of human performance were developed. These were:
BML Using Beaver's Ratios: The three ratios that Beaver found most predictive of failure (cash flow/total debt, net income/total assets, and total debt/total assets) were utilized in a multivariate discriminant analysis to classify the sample of thirty-two firms into defaulted and nondefaulted. Although Beaver's study focused on predicting bankruptcy instead of default, apphcation of the three ratios here resulted in a 0.72 correct classification. This benchmark is quite useful for our purposes because (a) it is the product of variables generated by a sample quite independent of the samples used here, (6) Beaver's three ratios were part of the information choice set available to lending officers, and (c) two of these ratios were ranked as fourth and sixth on the list of most frequently acquired information cues.
BM2. Using Most Frequently Acquired Cues:
Similar to the development of the first benchmark, the four variables most frequently acquired by lending analysts in this experiment were employed in a discriminant analysis to evaluate their predictive ability. The resulting classification yielded about 0.75 correct predictions."
BM3. Using the Model Generated by Experimental Sample: As shown in table 2, the results of this benchmark (denoted MPe\MS, in table 1) were about 0.906 correct classification using the six information items selected by the (environmental) mathematical model shown in table 2. Because the model estimation was based on the data of the experimental sample (which was also the sample used by lending officers), its correct classification is actually an upper bound for the performance expected of human subjects.
BM4. Using the Model Generated by the Validation Sample:
In this case, a model was generated by the sample displayed in panel B of table 2 and was subsequently projected into the experimental sample. The difference between this case and the third benchmark lies in the fact that the model was based on information contained in a different sample. The model estimation using the data of panel B resulted in 100-percent correct classification of both defaulted and nondefaulted firms; and when it was projected into the experimental sample it misclassified six of the default firms as nondefault. Due to the commonality of the control (nondefault) group between panels A and B, this measure derives a benchmark only for the classification of defaulted firms (0.57 correct classification), which is based on cross-vahdation. (If total number of correct classification is used, defatilt and nondefault, the percentage increases to 0.78.)
' Using the most frequently acquired six cues in a discriminant analysis did not change that classification.
Evaluation of Human Performance
JUDGMENT REVISIONS
After selecting no more than four items of information and using them in making predictions, subjects were permitted to select up to four more information items and then revise their judgments. The second round of information choice, use, and judgment was suggested only if the experimenter noted misclassification, which was true for aU the subjects." As a result of the revisions, the accuracy of suhjects' predictions improved on average by O.(X)7. The probabUity that this difference was significant is at least 0.18. The benefits of additional information in this case varied, in that eight subjects performed better by using the additional information, seven did worse, and thirteen showed no change in the accuracy of their predictions from the first round. Consequently, aU the measures that foUow £ire based on the predictive results of the second round.
INDICES OF INFORMATION CHOICE AND PROCESSING
The quality of predictions obtained by the six strategies (see table 1) was used to represent different measurements of validity. The results based on percentage of correct prediction (hit rates) are shown in table 4. These results assume that the loss functions of the misclassification are symmetric for the default and nondefault predictions.
Using these results, the foUowing comparisons are possihle: (t) The extent to which the choice of information cues hy human 
HP\HS
MP. IHS
MP,\HS
The judge's validity (achievement mdex) 0.625 (average) using human-selected information. The validity of the "model of man" using 0.625 (average) human-selected information. Environmental mathematical model us-0.675 ing information selected by humans.
Environmental mathematical model us-0.906 ing model-selected information. * Strategy S2 uses the linear model estimated from human responses and the information cues that they used to predict the environmental event. The linear model estimated from human response (the mode] of man) correctly predicted 0.84 of the responses of the judges. The 0.625 correct cJa^sifjcation shown in the table is the percentage of correct prediction of the environmental event using the "model of man."
S4 S5 S6
not studied not studied
MP,\MS
' One mmn reason for breaking the sample was our concern that having subjects process too many information cues in the first round would be incongruent with the evidence on limited cognitive ability (Tversky and Kahneman [1974] ). decision makers deviates from optimal, reflected in the difference between the quality of prediction obtained by strategies (S3) and (S6). Although both (S3) and (S6) utilize a mathematical model of a similar basic structure to predict the environmental event, one model uses information cues selected by the mathematical model, whereas the other uses the information cues chosen by human judges. The index, as measured by (MPt\HS) minus (MP,\MS) , is equal to -0.23, which suggests that human judges appear to have made a suboptimal choice of the cues they utilized.
(ii) The extent to which information processing by humans deviates from optimal processing, evaluated by the difference between strategies (SI) and (S3). While each uses the information cues selected by human judges to predict the environmental event, they differ on the processor of those cues-humans in strategy (Si) and models in strategy (S3). This difference, measured by (HPe\HS) minus (MPe\HS) is equal to -0.05, which suggests a minor advantage in processing by the mathematical model rather than human processing.
(iii) The extent to which weighting of cues by humans (assuming a linear model) deviates from optimal, based on a comparison of the results of strategies (S2) and (S3). This comparison shows that, on the average, weighting of information cues by humans results in a performance level slightly below (off by 0.05) the level of the model.
Beised on the results of this study, it appears that human predictions of default fell short of the predictive ability of the mathematical models utilized here, mainly because of the less than optimal choice of information cues. Neither the processing nor the weighting of cues appeared to contribute significantly to this lower performance, although the model slightly outperformed humans on that dimension as well.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER BENCHMARKS
The quality of overedl performance of human decision makers can be evaluated further by comparison with the benchmjirks. Given that the mean responses of the officers in predicting the actual events was about 0.625, a test of significance could be accomplished by comparing the percentage of correct classifications of each of the benchmarks against a confidence interval about 0.625. The 0.90 confidence interval shows the bounds to fall between 0.76 and 0.48 (see table 5 ), suggesting that loan officers performed worse than either of the first two benchmarks in the absolute, but not in the statistical sense and that they performed worse than the third benchmsurk in both absolute and statistical terms.
Furthermore, the performance of loan officers in classifying defaulted firms of the experimental sample averaged 0.42 correct classification, which is below the 0.58 level achieved by the fourth benchmark. All of these comparisons suggest that the loan officers generally performed worse than any of the mechanical models used in generating the benchmarks. 
Dealing with Priors
A confounding yariable, howeyer, was that the mechanical models were implemented under priors of equal size of default and no-default populations, while loan officers did not haye these same priors. This problem was eyaluated as foUows. First, we replicated the study with an explicit statement about the composition of the sample as one-half or 0.50 defaulted and one-half or 0.50 no-default. Second, we introduced some naiye, rule-of-thumb benchmarks which, in effect, are neutral with respect to the composition of our sample.
THE REPLICATION
Because of the expense and time associated with structtired interyiews, we randomly selected ten of the twenty-nine officers who performed the earlier study and asked them "to perform some more analysis for the study before proyiding them with the feedback." Each of the ten agreed to grant our research assistant a thirty-minute interyiew. At the interyiews, the research assistant indicated that the sample consisted of onehalf defaulted and one-half no-default firms and that we would appreciate their performing the task one more time with this knowledge in mind. They were asked to perform only one round of infonnation choice, use, and judgments, after which they were told of their performance on the earlier study. A different order might haye been desirable, but this order of task-then-feedback was adopted in an attempt to ayoid introducing any additional information, except the change in priors.
The replication was performed after a period of five to six months had elapsed since the first study. The average length of the replication interviews was about forty minutes. The results, reported in table 6, are somewhat discouraging (or encouraging, depending on one's viewpoint). As shown, the average performance of the ten officers was not generally better with the stated priors of 50 percent-50 percent, compared to the average performance without an explicit quantification of these priors. The mean change in the percentage of correct prediction was about 1 percent, and the standard deviation changed from 6.8 to 5.7 percent. Our research assistant observed that most of the subjects made judgments on the basis of the information they selected, then apparently balanced their judgments in order to achieve equal numbers in the categories of default and no-default. This balancing process along with the higher consensus appear to be the only meaningful outcomes of the explicit introduction of the percentage composition of the sample as 0.50 default and 0.50 nodefatUt. Although this result was not consistent with our expectation, we felt no need to continue the replication with the rest of the subjects.
RULES OF THUMB AS PREDICTORS
Even if loan officers were not told about the composition of our sample, the application of some rules of thumb could have generated better predictions than their own utilization of the information they acquired. Observing that twenty-two of the twenty-eight subjects acquired either one or hoth of the two ratios-current ratio and total deht/total assetswe attempted to generate classifications using rules of thumh which are independent of the composition of our sample hased on these two ratios. A known rule of thumh in traditional fundamental analysis of finance suggests that a current ratio smaller than 2.0 can imply a liquidity prohlem, which is reasonahly confirmed hy Beaver's data [1966, p. 82] . Similarly, Beaver's data also showed that failed firms had a total deht/ total assets greater than 0.50, whUe nonfailed firms had a stahle ratio of ahout 0.37. This is equivalent to stating that total deht/equity is 1,00 or higher for the failed firms. Accordingly, two rules of thumh were adopted: (a) classify as defaulted if current ratio is >2.0; and {b) classify as defaulted if total deht to equity ratio is <1.00.
The results showed 0.84 and 0.72 correct predictions for the first and the second rule, respectively. Both results are superior to the 0.625 ohtained hy loan officers in this study, especially given that these rules are independent of the actual composition of default and no-default in our sample, and that these rules use a smaller set of cues compared to any of the models discussed ahove. Of course, the sample sensitivity of these results is not known.
Summary and Limitations
In his synthesis of the 1976 Conference on Human Information Processing, Einhorn suggested that improvements in research in this area could he accomplished hy introducing information-seeking hehavior which would tend to induce decision makers to generate competing hypotheses ahout the henefits of each information cue. The main ohjective of our study was to introduce the concept of sharing information choice with the suhjects-a step in the direction of implementing Einhorn's suggestion.
The results can he summarized £is follows: (1) On the average, loan officers performed worse than the mechanical models used to generate various henchmarks, including the environmental models. (2) If one assumes that predicting the environmental event is the principal task, the different indices generated hy comparing different strategies of information choice and processing indicate that information choice hy suhjects is the major contrihuting factor to the relatively low performance of human judges. (3) Unlike the finding about information choice, the utilization of information hy human suhjects was not materially different from the model, even though the model stUl outperformed humans. (4) Replication of the study indicated that the knowledge of the composition of the sample (changes in priors) did not affect the quality of judgments made in this study-an unexpected finding. (5) The evidence suggests that judgments of reasonable quality could be made on the basis of the information contained in a few data items. (6) The main result here is consistent with the conclusion drawn hy Dawes and Corrigan [1974, p. 105] that "The whole trick is to decide what variables to look at and then to know how to add." That is, information choice, not weighting, is what matters.
Some limitations of this study must be mentioned. Neither the sample of the decision makers nor the sample of firms were randomly selected. The sample of firms was relatively small since we chose not to ask the participants to make more than thirty-two judgments each in each round of information choice, use, and judgment. Furthermore, we do not know the method by which the subjects made their information choice and whether the choice was made by elimination or by representation (Slovic et al. [1977, pp. 4-7] ). No feedback was provided to subjects dtiring the experiment, but the impact of this limitation on the findings is unknown. Finally, it was assumed that the model and the subjects are operating under the same type of loss function. Naturally, the loss function of human subjects may not be symmetric with respect to Type I and Type II prediction errors. These issues could provide a useful basis for further studies on the subject.
